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LIMITATIONS ON THE DOCTRINE OF DIPLOMATIC
IMMUNITY.
HERBERT T. LExl-m, A. B.. L. L. B.
Department of History, University of Wisconsin
TE GENERAL RuLEs oF ImMUNITY
That branch of international law which treats of the intercourse
of states includes the rules of diplomatic practice. Of this narrower
topic one phase consists of the principles of diplomatic immunity.
Bitter disputes, often quite serious, -have arisen over the claims of
diplomats under the doctrine of immunity; several of these disputes
have been decided by the common law courts of England and America.
Nor have casei of this nature ceased to arise1. It is therefore worth
the while of the members of the legal profession to understand the
chief legal privileges of diplomatic officers in the state to which they
are accredited. Accordingly, some brief considerations of the
doctrine of diplomatic immunity, together with a few possible excep-
tions to the usual dogmatic statements are herewith set forth2.
The "Printed Personal Instructions to the Diplomatic Agents
of the United States" for 1885 contains this statement: "A diplo-
matic representative possesses immunity from the criminal and civil
jurisdiction of the country of his sojourn, and cannot be sued, ar-
rested or punished by the law of that country." 3 The "Instructions
to Diplomatic Officers" for 1897 declare that "the personal im-
munity of a diplomatic agent extends to his household and especially
to his secretaries.'' 4 "Household" includes attaches, wife and family
I Witness the recent dispute between the Swiss Minister to the United States
and the late Justice W. B. Lamar.
. The present paper has treated the subject in hand from the standpoint of
English and American private law. Judicial decisions are almost entirely relied
upon since this material is the most valuable for the practising attorney. The
first few paragraphs of the paper attempt to summarize the rules and theory
of diplomatic immunity as found in any standard text, in order to refresh the
reader's memory.
A discussion of the waiver of Immunity has been omitted that it may be the
subject of another article.3
Wharton, Francrs: Digest of International Law, I., 644.
4Moore, J. B.: Digest of International Law, IV. 648.
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of the officer, and his servants. To clarify these general rules of
the law of nations and to make them a part of the private law of
their respective countries, Parliament and Congress have passed stat-
utes on the subject of diplomatic immunity. The Act of Congress
of 30th of April, 1790 (now U. S. Rev. Statutes, No. 4063)5 which
copied the English Act of 7th Anne Ch. 12, provides in substance
that "the person of any public minister of any foreign prince or
state authorized and received by the President, or any domestic or
domestic servant of such minister" is exempt from process, and the
serving of such process is declared void in every respect. The per-
son serving or suing out such process is to be imprisoned or fined at
the discretion of the court.6 Judicial construction of these acts has
provided a loophole in their apparently rigid provisions. That the
acts are not mandatory in the sense of changing the old law of na-
tions, but merely declaratory of that old law for the purpose of
penalizing offenders, has been held both in England 7 and America s
to be the true intent and meaning of the statutes. Hence if certain
exceptions to this rule of the immunity of diplomatic agents appear
in the public law, then the acts cannot be interpreted as abolishing
these exceptions.
The two theories upon which the doctrine of immunity has
from time to time rested have each helped to shape the corollaries
of the main proposition. Personal inviolability, the general term for
the earlier theory, was held to mean that the agent, being the direct
representative of the sovereign, an affront to the agent was an in-
sult to the sovereign. The Roman courts9, Vatte110  and even
Kent" supported this reasoning. Exterritoriality, the later theory,
asserts that the agent while actually present in the state to which he
is accredited, is legally still residing in the state which he represents
and so cannot be reached by legal process. Early and Mid-Nineteenth
"Revised Statutes of the United States, Section 4063.
Section 4064, Ibid.
Novello v. Toogood, 1 B. & C. 149; Viveash v. Becker, 3 M. & S. 284.
'Davis v. Packard, 7 Peters 276; Holbrook v. Henderson, 6 N. Y. Super. Ct. 619.
'Hunter: Roman Law, p. XLVIII.
10 "A respect due sovereigns should reflect upon their representatives and chief-
ly upon their ambassadors as representing their masters person in the first de-
gree." Vattel in "Droit des Gens," 54, 4th ch., 9th par. 81, quoted in Halleck.
International Law, I, 278, Edition by Baker.
11"Kent, however, believed the doctrine to rest upon both lines of reasoning,
i. e., exterritoriality as well as inviolability. Kent, James; Commentaries, III,
28.
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Century writers were loath to accept unreservedly this newer point
of view; Halleck especially dissented. 12  In 1874, however, the De-
partment of State in the Jay case said through Fish, the Secretary:
"The tendency of opinion in regard to the immunities of diplomatic
agents is believed to be strongly toward restricting them to ivhatever
may be indispensable to enable the agents to discharge their duties
with convenience and safety. The extreme doctrine of immunity
which was necessary in an age of barbarism and for the intercoursq
of uncivilized nations has happily yielded to the progress of Chris-
tianity and modern civilization."1 3 To this second theory the Amer-
ican Government has committed itself, as will be further seen by sub-
sequent quotations, and with this adoption of a more liberal line of
reasoning has come a loosening of the rules consequent upon the
theory.
14
Exemption extends to both the criminal and civil process of the
state to which the agent is accredited. The criterion for exemption
from criminal process ib thus stated by Wharton: ". . . this ex-
territoriality ordinarily protects the diplomatic agent also from pros-
ecution from crime; unless the crime be of so outrageous a character
and conspicuous as to forfeit his privileges or disturb the peace of the
country of his residence."1 5 Caleb Cushing while Attorney General
of the United States, said: "If the crime committed affects indi-
viduals only the government of the country is to demand his recall.
. . . If the crime affects the publia safety of the country the gov-
ernment may, for urgent, cause, either seize and hold his person until
the danger is over, or expel him from the country by force."' 6 This
last statement develops very clearly, for America at least, one limita-
tion upon the general rule of imunity from legal process.,
12 "It Is proper to distinguish between the inviolability of the public minister
and the legal fiction of his exterritoriality. . . . The true basis of all diplo-
matic privilege consists in the idea of Inviolability which international jurispru-
dence attaches to his person and to his office and from whch it cannot be sev-
ered." Halleck; International Law, I, 278, Edition by Baker.
A judicial discussion of the nature of the privilege is found In Schooner Ex-
change v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, Marshall, C. J.
3Mr. Fish, Sec'y of State to Mr. Jay, Min. to Austria. Quoted in Moore,
3. B.; Digest of International Law, IV, 648. Italics are author's.
"' This statement is also borne out by the subse~luent quotations in this paper
from the correspondence In the Jay case and from J. B. Moore's Digest of In-
ternational Law.
Is Wharton, Francis; Digest of International Law, 1, 644.
117 Op. S67, Cushing 1885, quoted in Wharton, Francis; Digest of International
Law, I, 648. Italics are author's.
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Civil exemption includes all actions arising ex contractu or ex
delicto. The rule that neither the real nor personal property of the
members of the diplomatic mission may be taken by either a writ of
attachment or execution 17 supplements the statement of the general
principle. That the exemption extends also to the agent's dwelling
house, goods and the archives of the mission is understood to mean
that "these cannot be entered, searched or detained under process
of local laws or by local authority."' 8  The reason for this and all
subsequent principles of exemption from civil and criminal process
was happily phrased by Fish: "The true test of privilege from suit
is whether the exercise of the municipal authority in question is an
unwarrantable and unreasonable interference with the freedom with
which the functions of the diplomatic representative must be per-
formed. "19 What constitutes an "unreasonable interference" is the
problem raised by these words.
DOES ExEMPTION EXTEND TO COMMERCIAL VENTURES?
The vast majority of civil cases in the courts (both British and
American) today are suits for the recovery in more or less direct
form of money. The present era is one of commercial ventures, cor-
porate and otherwise. Diplomatic agents and their official families
are not impervious to the American commercial spirit. Many of
them still consider the United States a get-rich-quick land. Mlay a
suit be entertained against a diplomatic officer as the result of a
commercial venture outside of his sphere of duties? Instances of
such ventures by the lesser members of a mission-or perhaps by
the secretaries or servants-are not rare and several interesting cases
are recorded, where, the scheme ending disastrously, the creditors
brought suit to recover their due amounts. The inflexible rules previ-
ously noticed would seem to seal the fate of such creditors' suits.
The more liberal theory of immunity shows its workings at this
juncture, however, for together with the "true test of privilege" may
be coupled another statement by Fish, "The practical application
17 This is true because as previously seen, such writs are declared void by
sec. 4063 Rev. Statutes of the U. S.
1Instructions to Diplomatic Officers of the U. S., quoted in Moore, J. B.;
Digest of International Law, IV, 648.
"Mr. Fish, See. of State to Mr. Jay, quoted in Wharton, Francis; Digest of
International Law, I, 642.
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of the doctrine among Christian people should be confined to cases
of the greatest importance. An envoy is not clothed with diplomatic
immunity to enable him to indulge with impunity in personal con-
troversies or to escape from liabilities to which he otheruise might
be subject. The assertion of these immunities should be reserved for
the more important and delicate occasions and should never be made
use of when the facts of a particular case expose the envoy to the
suspicion that private interest or a desire to escape personal or
pecuniary liability is the motive which induced it.20 Here is a second
limitation on the doctrine; it would seem also, a more important
limitation. It will bear further examination.
Consider the following hypothetical ease as a basis for future
discussion: A, a citizen of X state, is duly appointed and properly
received as the minister to Y state. At the capitol of Y he is pro-
vided with a residence the property of and furnished by X. After
a few months residence in Y, A discovers his salary to be insufficient
for his needs. He therefore buys, for the purpose of speculation,
100 shares of stock in the C. D. & E. Railroad whose lines operate
in Y. Not daring to use his own name in this transaction, A secures
B, a citizen of Y, to act as agent for him. A wreck occurs on the
line of the railroad shortly after the purchase by A, and the peculiar
facts of the wreck lead to an investigation by public authorities.
It is shown in the course of this investigation that the stock of the
road is not fully paid up. The stockholders of the corporation are,
by the law of Y, liable only for the amount of their stock subscription.
The report of the investigating committee brings a receivership .for
the company and the receiver now sues the stockholders to secure
complete payment of their holdings. A, it is discovered, owes 25%
of his original subscription. The true owner of the stock having been
discovered, the receiver, ignoring B, sues A to recover the 25%.
What decision should be given under the present law? If the suit
cannot be maintained can the receiver by another action obtain the
stock certificates which A holds?
Several English decisions make clear the British position on
the first of these questions. In Magdelena, Steam Navigation Com-
2 Mr. Fish, Sec'y to Mr. Jay, quoted in Moore, J. B.; Dl-est of International
Law, IV, 648. Italics are the author's.
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pany v. Martin2 1 , a case almost directly in point, Martin was Envoy
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Guatemala
and New Granada to England, and as such was received by the
Crown. The reception occurred previous to 1856. The Magdelena
Steam Navigation Company, on November 3, 1856, was fully reg-
istered under the Joint Stock Companies Act of England, which Act
made the company a modified form of partnership having shares of
stock. Martin secured 100 shares of stock in the company and held
them as a properly authorized stockholder. The company on March
10, 1857, voted to wind up its business and to levy an assessment
of £6 on each share of stock. Martin was notified of the assessment
but refused to pay and remained in default. Action was thereupon
brought by the company to recover the £600 owing from Martin.
The defendant replied in persbn, alleging his official character and
claiming exemption from the suit because of his privilege of im-
niunity which had not been waived. Very complete arguments were
made by the counsel fo both parties. The main contention of the
plaintiff was that the defendant by engaging in trade in England
had forfeited his right to immunity. In support of this contention
plaintiff's counsel cited Coke's famous statement: "If a foreign
ambassador, being prorex, comnitteth any crime which is contra jns
gentium . . . he loseth the privilege and dignity of an am-
bassador as unworthy of so high a place and may be punished here
as any other private alien . . . and so of contracts that be good
jure gentium, he must answer -here. "22 It was admitted by the plain-
tiff that under ordinary circumstances the ambassador's residence
and personal property were exempt from seizure, but that by en-
gaging in trade, he had forfeited that right. The decision, which
was read by Lord Campbell, may 'be summed up in these words of
the opinion: "The question raised by this record is whether the
public minister of a foreign state, accredited to and received by
Her Majesty, havinF no real property in England and having done
nothing to disentitle him to the privilege generally belonging to suck
212 Ellis & Ellis, 94 (1859). Though not the first decision on this phase of the
law, the Martin case is perhaps the most important.
Coke, Edward; Institutes of the Law, IV, 153.
Limitations on Diplomatic Immunity
publio minister,23 may be sued against his will in the courts of this
country for a debt, neither his person nor his goods being touched
by the suit, while -he remains such minister. He (the defendant)
says by his plea to the jurisdiction of the court that by reason of
his privilege as minister he ought not to be compelled to answer.
We are of the opinion that his plea is good and that we are bound
to give judgment in his favor."
The Martin case, though decided before the era of corporations
and commercial adventures in corporate enterprises, was neverthe-
.ess followed in the decision of Parkinson V. Potter.24 There the
question was of the exemption of an ambassador from the payment
of certain parochial rates for the keeping of the poor of the parish.
Justice Wills giving the opinion of the court, said: "Reliance was
placed on Taylor v. Best.2 5  . . It is true that Maule, J., ex-
pressed doubts as to whether an ambassador in England could claim
complete exemption from all English process. But that doubt was re-
moved and pronounced to be ill-founded in the considered and
elaborate judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench in Magdelena Steam
Navigation Company v. Martin.20  . . . There is therefore noth-
ing in English law which contravenes the doctrine of immunity as
laid down by the writers of international law." The same court in
Mursus Bey v. Gadban,2 7 approved the Martin case in these words:
"He did not assert (speaking of the argument of counsel), for this
would have been useless, that Mursus Pacha could have been ef-
fectively sued while he was de facto ambassador at London, for the
case of Magdelena Steam Navigation Company v. Martin, which has
never been doubted, settled that he could not, as during that period
he was exempt from the jurisdiction of the courts of this country."
The doctrine of the Martin case seems, therefore, to be soundly im-
pressed upon the minds of the English bench. The Island King-
dom consequently has an absolute rule that no diplomatic agent may
be sued on any contract, express or implied, which arises out of a
business venture-in fact this last clause seems to be totally imma-
Italics are the author's. That the act of Martin was not considered suffi-
cient to cause a forfeiture of privilege may be inferred from this statement.
2416 Q. B. D. 152 (1586).
"An earlier case. 14 C. B. 487.
"Italics are the author's.
-2 Q. B. D. (1894) 354.
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terial. The receiver of the C. D. & E. Railroad could not, in Eng-
land, recover the assessment from A.
No case bearing directly on this point appears to have been de-
cided in the American courts. 26 Notes on the subject are found in
Corpus Juris, the Harvard Law Review and other standard works. 29
Magdelena Steam Navigation Company v. Martin is treated as final
and is cited in nearly all the American cases that in any way touch
this topic. Parkinson v. Potter and Taylor v. Best are also cited,
showing by inference the approval of American law writers.
The second point of the hypothetical case brings to light cer-
tain further limitations on the exemption. Moore writes: "If a
diplomatic representative holds in a foreign country real or personal
property aside from that which pertains to him as minister, it is
subject to the local laws.''30 The same principle may be found by
inference in another quotation from the same source: "Immunity
from local jurisdiction extends to a diplomatic representative's dwell-
ing house and goods and to the archives of the mission.''31 Three
things are here mentioned as exempt-nothing more. Moore has
taken both of these statements directly from the "Instructions to
Diplomatic Officers" of 1897 issued by the State Department. To
the same effect, Corpus Juris holds that ". . . an ambassador
does not forfeit his privileges by engaging in trade. But the ap-
plication of this rule does not prevent the property embarked by
him and accruing to him in his capacity of tradesman32 from 'being
subject to seizure at the instance of creditors. . . . 33 Conse-
quently it appears to be true in America at least that any property
either real or personal which the agent may hold aside from the
mansion house, goods and archives, may be taken by the creditors
of the representative. Parkinson v. Potter for England sanctions
this principle. "In Novello v. Toogood," 34 says the court, "it was
23 Dicta on this rule is to be found in United States v. Benner, 24 Fed. Cas.
1084; Holbrook v. Henderson, 6 N. Y. Super. Ct. 619; State v. De la Foret, 11 S.
C. L. 217; Schooner Exchange v. AlcFaddon, 7 Cranch 116.
212 Corpus Juris 1302-1306; 31 Harv. L. Rev. 803. A note is also to be found in
the Consolidated Statutes of the United States, (1913) under Sec. 4063 and 4064,
R. S.
30Moore, J. B.; Digest of International Law, IV, 646.
a Ibid.
12 Italics are the author's.
32 Corpus Juris 1303.
41 B. & C. 149.
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held that the goods of a chorister in the service of the Portugese am-
bassador were not privileged from distress for the poor rates. But
in that case the servant was carrying on the business of a lodging
house keeper in the house in question. Most writers on international
law say that with regard to an ambassador even, although he does
not lose his privileges by engaging in trade in the country to which
he is accredited, yet the immunity of his goods does nwt extend to his
stock-ir-trade."3  The receiver of the C. D. & E. Railroad has a
right to recover the 100 shares of stock.
The method by which the stock is to be secured, however, con-
stitutes a very real problem. If they were boldly seized without
any attempt at legal process, then strangely enough the problem
would be solved. Then, too, a suit or a seizure might be allowed under
some legal process where "this can be accomplished without per-
sonal service on him (agent), without infringing his dignity as an
ambassador and without interference with the proper discharge of'
his duties." 3 6 But, presuming that a judgment is secured against
the agent, the statutory provisidns previously noticed forbid the is-
suance of any writ against him; an execution would therefore be im-
possible. 37 Assuming, however, that the statutes are merely declara-
tory of the public law, and that the sources of this public law38 allow
the taking of property not connected with the actual duties of the
representative, then it logically follows that the court should rule
that the receiver of the C. D. & E. Railroad may take the 100 shares
of stock upon a writ of execution, following Novello v. Toogood and
similar cases. This conclusion is the only true one that can be drawn
from the premises.
Courts are loath to make such decisions, however, because of the
fear of international prejudices following a suit and execution where
even the name of a diplomatic agent appears. To avoid this dis-
"16 Q. B. D. 152. Italics are the author's.
"2 Corpus Juris 1303.
It is interesting to note the rule that if a judgment is secured against a
diplomatic representative, It is not "nugatory, for the inability is only tem-
porary." 31 Harv. L. Rev. 803. But the inability lasts until the agent is no
longer a representative, which in many cases is after he has returned to his
own country. The court giving the judgment is then powerless to enforce it,
unless the stock-in-trade is left behind; that is not likely to happen.
"That is, judicial decisions, State Department Instructions, opinions of the
executive officers, etc., such as are noticed above.
34 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
agreeable feature, as well as to conform to the rule against personal
service, it is the suggestion of this paper that some form of a pro-
ceedings in rem be worked out, to secure the stock-in-trade, even
though such proceedings might smack of confiscation. At any rate,
such action would avoid the statutes of 1790 and 7th Anne, and pro-
vide a practical remedy for the creditor.
Madison, Wisconsin.
